Informed trading and the ‘leakage’ of information
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Informed trading and the 'leakage' of information
This paper, in a Shapley-Shubik market game framework, examines the effect of “leakage” of information: private information becoming available to uninformed traders at a later date. We show that (a) If information acquisition by the informed traders is costless, this leads to faster revelation of information; (b) If information acquisition is costly, there may be no acquisition of information; ...
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there is no doubt that human being needs to become integrated with industry and industry needs to be progressed, daily. on the other hand, serious events in industrial units specially in oil industries has been shown that such damages and events are industry related ones. the consequence of such events and damages which resulted in chemical and poisoned explosions and loss of life and property ...
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Does information asymmetry among traders of a firm’s stock increase its cost of capital? We first show that institutional traders in the Shanghai Stock Exchange have a strong information advantage. We then show that past aggressiveness of institutional trading in a stock is a good predictor of institutions’ current and future information advantage in this stock. Sorting stocks on this predictor...
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I present a simple model of informed trading in which asset values are derived from imperfectly competitive product markets and private information events occur at individual firms. The model predicts that informed traders may have incentives to make information-based trades in the stocks of competitors, especially when events occur at firms with large market shares. In the context of 759 earni...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 2003
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/s0022-0531(03)00018-8