Insider Trading with Partially Informed Traders
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Informed Options Trading prior to M&A Announcements: Insider Trading?∗
We investigate informed trading activity in equity options prior to the announcement of corporate mergers and acquisitions (M&A). For the target companies, we document pervasive directional options activity, consistent with strategies that would yield abnormal returns to investors with private information. This is demonstrated by positive abnormal trading volumes, excess implied volatility and ...
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We quantify the pervasiveness of informed trading activity in target companies’ equity options before M&A announcements. About 25% of takeovers have positive abnormal volumes, which are greater for short-dated out-of-the-money calls, consistent with bullish directional trading ahead of the announcement. Over half of this abnormal activity cannot be explained by speculation, news and rumors, tra...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2011
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.1959836