Institutional Blockholders and Voluntary Disclosure

Debt and Voluntary Disclosure

In attempting to understand voluntary corporate disclosure, many empirical studies have used leverage as an explanatory variable. One reason for an association between debt and disclosure relates to the agency costs of the shareholder-bondholder conflict. By voluntarily disclosing information, shareholders may be able to reduce this agency cost. We provide an additional reason why debt and disc...

VOLUNTARY ASSURANCE OF VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE∗ by

Some Factors that Influence the Quality of Voluntary Disclosure

The purpose of this study is to investigate the factors affecting the evaluation of the quality of voluntary disclosure, given that the factors used in internal research due to having an external source and focusing on the number of disclosures may not be an appropriate criterion for measuring the quality of information disclosure, so, it is necessary to provide new influencing factors on the e...

Earnings Non-synchronicity and Voluntary Disclosure

Earnings non-synchronicity captures the extent to which firm-specific factors determine a firm’s earnings, and has important implications to a firm’s information environment. Prior research shows that high earnings non-synchronicity impedes corporate outsiders’ information processing. Given managers generally possess superior information about their firms’ unique operating and reporting strateg...

Voluntary Quality Disclosure and Market Interaction

M disclose quality information directly to potential consumers using a variety of communication channels. This study investigates how competition may influence duopoly firms’ incentive to voluntarily reveal quality information. We show that firms in competitive markets reveal less information than a monopoly firm. In addition, sequential disclosure leads to asymmetric equilibrium disclosure beh...