Institutional monitoring and litigation risk: Evidence from employee disputes

Patent Litigation with Endogenous Disputes

Monitoring and Employee Shirking: Evidence from MLB Umpires

Standard neoclassical principal-agent theory predicts that stricter monitoring should reduce employee shirking from principal desires; however, recent analyses indicate that social aspects of principal-agent relationships may result in monitoring “crowding out” disciplinary effects. From 2001 to 2008 Major League Baseball (MLB) instituted an automated pitch-tracking system (QuesTec) to assist i...

Institutional Ownership, Business Cycles and Earnings Informativeness of Income Smoothing: Evidence from Iran

Managers engage in income smoothing either to communicate private information about future earnings to investors (informativeness hypothesis) or to distort financial performance for opportunistic purposes (opportunism hypothesis). Business cycles and the monitoring role of institutional ownership may affect the earnings informativeness of income smoothing. The purpose of this research is to exa...

Implicit and Explicit Instruction and EFL Learners’ Implicit Knowledge Development: Evidence from Word Monitoring Task

Research on the effect of implicit and explicit instruction on developing learners’ explicit knowledge by the use of measures of explicit knowledge abounds in the literature. However, measuring learners’ implicit knowledge employing fine-grained measures has rarely been the concern of researchers in the field. Therefore, the present study is an attempt to scrutinize the effectiveness of implici...

Empirical evidence and malpractice litigation.