Integration of price cap and yardstick competition schemes in electrical distribution regulation
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
coordination of protective schemes in distribution and subtransmission systems including distributed generation
نصب منابع پراکنده در سیستم های توزیع و فوق توزیع علاوه بر مزیت های فراوان، مشکلاتی را هم به همراه دارد. یکی از این مشکلات تأثیر این منابع روی اندازه جریان های اتصال کوتاه است. به طور معمول از حفاظت های مبتنی بر اصل جریان زیاد در سیستم های توزیع و فوق توزیع استفاده می شود. از مهمترین طرح های حفاظتی استفاده شده در فیدرهای توزیع، حفاظت فیوز- ریکلوزر است. همچنین از طرح های حفاظتی جریان زیاد جهتی در...
Price Cap Regulation Preliminary version
We study the effect of price cap regulation on investment in new capacity in an oligopolistic (Cournot) industry. We use a continuous time model with stochastic demand. The contribution of this paper is both theoretical and practical. On the theoretical side, we show that there exists an optimal price cap that maximizes investment incentives. Just as in the case of deterministic demand, the opt...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IEEE Transactions on Power Systems
سال: 2000
ISSN: 0885-8950
DOI: 10.1109/59.898123