Intellectual virtues and the epistemic value of truth
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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Epistemic virtues or epistemic values, we are told, play a major role in our assessments of the bearing of evidence in science. There is something quite right about this notion; and there is something quite wrong about it. My goal in the chapter is to explain each. In brief, what is right about the notion of epistemic virtue or value is that criteria such as simplicity and explanatory power do ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Synthese
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0039-7857,1573-0964
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-019-02418-z