Intentionality as Consciousness of Marks
نویسندگان
چکیده
Abstract In this short comment, I will first recapitulate some of the substantive claims Textor attributes to Brentano, and then propose use Kant’s epistemology extend central argumentative conclusion Textor’s article, namely assertion that “where there is something mental, awareness marks”.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Grazer Philosophische Studien
سال: 2023
ISSN: ['0165-9227', '1875-6735']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1163/18756735-00000187