Interactive unawareness revisited
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Interactive unawareness revisited
We analyze a model of interactive unawareness introduced by Heifetz, Meier and Schipper (HMS). We consider two axiomatizations for their model, which capture different notions of validity. These axiomatizations allow us to compare the HMS approach to both the standard (S5) epistemic logic and two other approaches to unawareness: that of Fagin and Halpern and that of Modica and Rustichini. We sh...
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We propose a notion of a sub-model for each agent at each state in the Heifetz et al (2006) model of interactive unawareness. Presuming that each agent is fully cognizant of his sub-model causes no di¢ culty and fully describes his knowledge and his beliefs about the knowledge and awareness of others. In addition by relaxing some of the conditions that Heifetz et al imposed in their framework w...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.01.012