Interdependent Security With Strategic Agents and Cascades of Infection
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Interdependent Security with Strategic Agents and Global Cascades
We investigate global cascades in networks consisting of strategic agents with interdependent security. We assume that the strategic agents have choices between i) investing in protecting themselves, ii) purchasing insurance to transfer (some of) risks, and iii) taking no actions. Using a population game model, we study how various system parameters, such as node degrees, infection propagation ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
سال: 2016
ISSN: 1063-6692,1558-2566
DOI: 10.1109/tnet.2015.2408598