Interdependent Value Multi-unit Auctions for Initial Allocation of Emission Permits
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Collusion in Auctions for Emission Permits :
Environmental markets have several institutional features that provide a new context for the use of auctions and which have not been studied previously. This paper reports on laboratory experiments testing three auction forms – uniform and discriminatory price sealed bid auctions and an ascending clock auction. We test the ability of subjects to tacitly or explicitly collude in order to maximiz...
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Economic analysis of emission permit markets, and particularly of the initial permit allocation, have concentrated largely on static approaches. This is somewhat unsatisfactory as the allocation method in subsequent commitment periods may influence the behaviour of the market participants in the current period. For instance, some advocate a system of “rolling grandfathering”, in which later per...
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We consider an auction environment with interdependent values. Each bidder can learn her payoff type through costly information acquisition. We contrast the socially optimal decision to acquire information with the equilibrium solution in which each agent has to privately bear the cost of information acquisition. In the context of the generalized Vickrey–Clarke– Groves mechanism, we establish t...
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We consider an auction environment with interdependent values. Each bidder can learn her payoff type through costly information acquisition. We contrast the socially optimal decision to acquire information with the equilibrium solution in which each agent has to privately bear the cost of information acquisition. In the context of the generalized Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism, we establish th...
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I study auctions in which there exists an asymmetry in bidders’ knowledge about their interdependent valuations. Bidders consist of two groups: the insiders, who are perfectly informed of their valuations, and the outsiders, who only observe onedimensional signals, thus being partially informed of their valuations. When only one insider and one outsider exist, both English and second-price auct...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Procedia Environmental Sciences
سال: 2016
ISSN: 1878-0296
DOI: 10.1016/j.proenv.2016.02.080