Interim partially correlated rationalizability
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Interim partially correlated rationalizability
We formalize a solution concept called interim partially correlated rationalizability (IPCR), which was implicitly discussed in both Ely and Peski (2006) and Dekel et al. (2007). IPCR allows for interim correlations, i.e., correlations that depend on opponents’ types but not on the state of nature. As a direct extension of Ely and Peski’s main result, we show that hierarchies of beliefs over co...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2015
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.03.012