Interim Rationalizable Implementation of Functions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Rationalizable implementation
We consider the implementation of social choice functions under complete information in rationalizable strategies. A strict (and thus stronger) version of the monotonicity condition introduced by Maskin (1999) is necessary under the solution concept of rationalizability. Assuming the social choice function is responsive (i.e., it never selects the same outcome in two distinct states), we show t...
متن کاملRationalizable Implementation of Correspondences∗
A new condition, which we call uniform monotonicity, is shown to be necessary and almost sufficient for rationalizable implementation of correspondences. Uniform monotonicity is much weaker than Maskin monotonicity and reduces to it in the case of functions. Maskin monotonicity, the key condition for Nash implementation, had also been shown to be necessary for rationalizable implementation of s...
متن کاملRobust Implementation in Weakly Rationalizable Strategies
Weakly rationalizable implementation represents a generalization of robust implementation to dynamic mechanisms. It is so conservative that virtual implementation in weakly rationalizable strategies is characterized by the same conditions as robust virtual implementation by static mechanisms. We show that despite that, (exact) weakly rationalizable implementation is more permissive than (exact)...
متن کاملRationalizable Trade
“No-trade” theorems provide sufficient conditions for the absence of equilibrium trade between asymmetrically informed players.1 In this paper, we examine when trade is rationalizable. Since rationalizability is a weaker solution concept than equilibrium, trade is sometimes rationalizable, even when there is no equilibrium trade. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for rationalizable...
متن کاملRationalizable voting
We derive necessary and sufficient conditions in order for binary voting choices over a finite number of pairs of alternatives to be consistent with voter preferences that admit concave utility representations. These conditions imply simple testable restrictions on the location of voters’ ideal points, and can be used to predict individual voting behavior. On the other hand, if the location of ...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2020
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3713463