Interjurisdictional competition with adverse selection
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Theories of Interjurisdictional Competition
Associate Professor of Economics, Simmons College. The author would like to thank Caroline Hoxby, Andy Reschovsky, and Bob Tannenwald for their helpful comments on earlier versions , and she is grateful to Lora Slo-mich for her able research assistance on this paper. Theories of Interjurisdictional Competition. .. one of the great strengths of federalism is the opportunity it presents for the d...
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Part I of this Essay shows that two central principles of the EC, namely mobility between Member States and decentralization of economic policies (subsidiarity), imply that Member States and other lower-level jurisdictions necessarily are in competition with one another (locational competition). Part II presents an outline of a theory of interjurisdictional competition that suggests, first, tha...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Public Economics
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0047-2727
DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2019.01.012