Intermediary cost and coexistence puzzle
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Intermediary Commissions and Kickbacks∗
We investigate the role of commissions paid by product providers to information intermediaries who advise customers on product suitability. These commissions and hidden “kickbacks” are widespread and controversial in markets for retail financial products and health services. We show that product providers have an incentive to pay commissions to steer the intermediary’s advice and to counteract ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economics Letters
سال: 2012
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.04.103