International environmental agreements and imperfect enforcement: Evidence from CITES
نویسندگان
چکیده
International environmental agreements address global problems such as the decline in biodiversity. The Convention on Trade Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) regulates international trade wildlife to prevent its decline. Discussions about CITES’ effectiveness abound, but evidence is lacking. We combine largest available panel database populations with history countries’ membership species’ protection under CITES. find that after more than 20 years a inclusion into CITES, increase by 66% countries thorough enforcement, irrespective whether species only restricted or completely banned Our results suggest re-focusing discussions away from CITES should partially restrict impose complete ban, towards better enforcement. More generally, we enforcement crucial for effective agreements.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
سال: 2023
ISSN: ['0095-0696', '1096-0449']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2023.102784