International R&D Rivalry and Industrial Strategy without Government Commitment
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Review of International Economics
سال: 1996
ISSN: 0965-7576,1467-9396
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9396.1996.tb00107.x