International tax competition and gains from tax harmonization
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
International Tax Competition and Coordination
This paper aims to provide a comprehensive survey of the theory of international tax competition. Starting with the standard framework, it visits the non-cooperative equilibrium of tax competition, analyses aspects of partial and regional coordination, repeated interaction, stock-flow-effects, agglomeration effects and time consistency issues in dynamic models. We discuss profit shifting in the...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economics Letters
سال: 1991
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: 10.1016/0165-1765(91)90245-g