Interventionist Causal Exclusion and Non‐reductive Physicalism
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Interventionist Causal Exclusion and Non-reductive Physicalism
The first part of this paper presents an argument showing that the currently most highly acclaimed interventionist theory of causation, i.e. the one advanced by Woodward, excludes supervening macro properties from having a causal influence on effects of their micro supervenience bases. Moreover, this interventionist exclusion argument is demonstrated to rest on weaker premises than classical ex...
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In recent years, the debate on the problem of causal exclusion has seen an ‘interventionist turn’. Numerous non-reductive physicalists (e.g. Shapiro and Sober 2007) have argued that Woodward’s (2003) interventionist theory of causation provides a means to empirically establish the existence of nonreducible mental-to-physical causation. By contrast, Baumgartner (2010) has presented an interventi...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Studies in the Philosophy of Science
سال: 2009
ISSN: 0269-8595,1469-9281
DOI: 10.1080/02698590903006909