Introduction: Bargaining on constitutions – Political settlements and constitutional state-building
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Constitutional reason and political identity
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Global Constitutionalism
سال: 2017
ISSN: 2045-3817,2045-3825
DOI: 10.1017/s2045381716000216