Intuitionistic Choice and Restricted Classical Logic
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Intuitionistic Choice and Restricted Classical Logic
Recently, Coquand and Palmgren considered systems of intuitionistic arithmetic in all finite types together with various forms of the axiom of choice and a numerical omniscience schema (NOS) which implies classical logic for arithmetical formulas. Feferman subsequently observed that the proof theoretic strength of such systems can be determined by functional interpretation based on a non-constr...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: BRICS Report Series
سال: 2000
ISSN: 1601-5355,0909-0878
DOI: 10.7146/brics.v7i12.20139