Inverse auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Injecting unique minima into random sets and applications to “Inverse Auctions”
Consider N balls that are distributed among V urns according to some distribution G. We do not see the outcome and now have to place one ball into one urn with the goal of maximizing the probability that it will be the left-most urn containing a single ball. How should we proceed? This is the urn-model translation of an interesting problem posed by an internetauction offered by a German real-es...
متن کاملAuctions
Auctions are key mechanisms for allocating scarce resources among multiple parties. While traditionally auctions have mainly been applied to the selling of physical goods, they are becoming increasingly popular as mechanisms for such diverse tasks as procurement, bandwidth allocation, or selling online ad space. At the same time, privacy is a crucial issue in electronic commerce. A major reason...
متن کاملKeyword Auctions as Weighted Unit-Price Auctions
In recent years, unit-price auctions in which bidders bid their willingness-to-pay for per-unit realized outcome have been adopted by major keyword advertising providers such as Yahoo!, Google, and MSN, in selling keyword advertising slots on web sites. The majority of keyword auctions are pay-per-click auctions in which advertisers specify their willingness-to-pay per click, and pay by the cli...
متن کاملAuctions with Entry versus Entry in Auctions∗
We show that an auctioneer may prefer to restrict entry by exacting an admission fee to having an extra potential bidder in an auction setting with endogenous bidder entry. We also highlight that admission fees and reserve prices are different instruments in a setting with uncertainty over entry costs, and that optimal mechanisms in such settings may be higher-dimensional than in Myerson (1981)...
متن کاملQuantum Auctions
We present a quantum auction protocol using superpositions to represent bids and distributed search to identify the winner(s). Measuring the final quantum state gives the auction outcome while simultaneously destroying the superposition. Thus non-winning bids are never revealed. Participants can use entanglement to arrange for correlations among their bids, with the assurance that this entangle...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: ACM Transactions on Algorithms
سال: 2009
ISSN: 1549-6325,1549-6333
DOI: 10.1145/1644015.1644036