Investigating How the Equilibria of the Electricity Market are Affected by Modeling the Strategic Behavior of Consumers

The paper proposes a formulation for generalized Nash equilibrium model which incorporates the strategic biddings of some consumers capable providing reserve and balancing services in day-ahead markets, respectively. bidding electricity market is modelled using bilevel optimization programming, where cost minimized at Upper Level (UL), energy costs clearing process are co-optimized lower level (LL). By means strong duality theorem, original transformed into an equivalent single-level Mathematical Problem with Equilibrium Constraints (MPEC). joint problem all MPECs, one per consumer, constitutes (EPEC). resulting EPEC finally formulated as auxiliary Mixed-Integer Linear Programming (MILP) problem. To this end, exact linearization technique Fortuny-Amat transformation adopted to substitute nonlinear terms complementarity conditions. In addition, parametrization used replace dual variable associated equation appears diagonalization method also part ex-post analysis verify obtained solutions resulted MILP. Finally, 3-bus illustrative example IEEE RTS 24-Bus System 118-Bus considered investigate performance proposed approach.