Is Delegating Half of Demand Management Sensible?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: International Review of Applied Economics
سال: 1998
ISSN: 0269-2171,1465-3486
DOI: 10.1080/02692179800000016