Is Executive Risk-Taking a Bridge Between Compensation Incentive and Innovation Intensity?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Executive Compensation and Strategic Risk-Taking in IT
This study examines how the risk-taking incentive of top executives drives the strategic risk-taking in corporate IT implementation. We use the risk incentive provided in executive compensation to capture top executives’ risk-taking incentive, and develop measures of aggressive IT implementation to capture strategic risk-taking in IT implementation. Our analysis provides empirical evidence that...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Advances in social science, education and humanities research
سال: 2021
ISSN: ['2352-5398']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.2991/assehr.k.210407.054