Is the Veil of Ignorance Transparent?

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Is the Veil of Ignorance Transparent ?

— Theories of justice in the spirit of Rawls and Harsanyi argue that fair-minded people should aspire to make choices for society as if in the original position, that is, behind a veil of ignorance that prevents them from knowing their own social positions. In this paper, we provide a fairly simple framework showing that preferences in front of the veil of ignorance (i.e., in face of everyday r...

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This paper uses theory and experiments to study situations in which individuals make choices for themselves and for others in situations intended to resemble what Rawls and Harsanyi would describe as “behind the veil of ignorance.” Theory suggests a (surprisingly overlooked) decomposition of choices behind the veil of ignorance into choices in more familiar altruistic and risk environments. Our...

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Piercing the Veil of Ignorance∗

Theories of justice in the spirit of Harsanyi and Rawls argue that fair-minded people should aspire to make choices for society — that is, for themselves and for others — as if in the original position, behind a veil of ignorance that prevents them from knowing their own social and economic positions in society. While the original position is a purely hypothetical situation, developed as a thou...

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: OEconomia

سال: 2011

ISSN: 2113-5207

DOI: 10.4074/s2113520711012072