Iterated weak dominance and subgame dominance
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Iterated weak dominance and subgame dominance
In this paper, we consider finite normal form games satisfying transference of decisionmaker indifference. We show that any set of strategies surviving k rounds of elimination of some weakly dominated strategies can be reduced to a set of strategies equivalent to the set of strategies surviving k rounds of elimination of all weakly dominated strategies in every round by (at most k) further roun...
متن کاملIterated Weaker-than-Weak Dominance
We introduce a weakening of standard gametheoretic dominance conditions, called δdominance, which enables more aggressive pruning of candidate strategies at the cost of solution accuracy. Equilibria of a game obtained by eliminating a δ-dominated strategy are guaranteed to be approximate equilibria of the original game, with degree of approximation bounded by the dominance parameter, δ. We can ...
متن کاملAdaptive Learning and Iterated Weak Dominance
This article addresses the idea that rational players should not play iteratively weakly dominated strategies by showing that when a particular type of adaptive learning process converges, then players must have learned to play strategy profiles equivalent to those that survive iterated nice weak dominance and, for certain games, equivalent to those that survive iterated weak dominance. For gam...
متن کاملOrder Independence for Iterated Weak Dominance
In general, the result of the elimination of weakly dominated strategies depends on order. We define nice weak dominance. Under nice weak dominance, order does not matter. We identify an important class of games under which nice weak dominance and weak dominance are equivalent, and so the order under weak dominance does not matter. For all games, the result of iterative nice weak dominance is a...
متن کاملCORRIGENDUM Order Independence for Iterated Weak Dominance
In Marx and Swinkels (1997), we identify a condition on a normal form game, transference of decisionmaker indifference (TDI), under which the order of elimination by weak dominance does not matter. That is, regardless of the order in which weakly dominated strategies are removed, any two full reductions—games in which no further removals are possible—are the same up to the addition or removal o...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Mathematical Economics
سال: 2005
ISSN: 0304-4068
DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2003.11.013