Job design, delegation and cooperation: A principal-agent analysis
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: European Economic Review
سال: 1994
ISSN: 0014-2921
DOI: 10.1016/0014-2921(94)90104-x