JOINT VENTURES, POLLUTION AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Joint Ventures, Pollution and Environmental Policy
We examine the impact of abatement taxes on the pollution level in a duopoly framework with endogenous market structure. We demonstrate that an increase in abatement taxes could trigger a regime-switch from joint ventures to Cournot competition, causing the pollution level to increase. Moreover, abatement taxes can implement the first best outcome if and only if the industry is not too pollutin...
متن کاملJoint Ventures , Licensing , and Industrial Policy
This paper reconsiders the explanation of R&D subsidies by Spencer and Brander (1983) and others by allowing firms to license their innovations and to pool their R&D investments. We show that in equilibrium R&D joint ventures are formed and licensing occurs in a way that eliminates the strategic benefits of R&D investment in the export oligopoly game. Nevertheless, national governments are driv...
متن کاملJoint Ventures , Optimal Licensing , and R & D Subsidy Policy
We reconsider the justifications of R&D subsidies by Spencer and Brander (1983) and others by allowing firms to pool R&D investments and license innovations. In equilibrium R&D joint ventures are formed and licensing occurs in a way that eliminates the strategic benefits of R&D investment in the subsequent oligopoly game. Nevertheless, governments subsidize their domestic firms in order to rais...
متن کامل1 Joint Ventures and Alliances
Knowledge management is the conscious and active management of creating, disseminating, evolving and applying knowledge to strategic ends. In this paper, we examine knowledge management in the context of international joint ventures (IJVs), activities that cut across organizational and national boundaries, to show how to manage the behavioral and contextual considerations to create value for th...
متن کاملSymmetric Research Joint Ventures
We introduce the concept of cooperative substitutes and complements, and use it to throw light on the conditions for a research joint venture to choose equal levels of R&D by all member firms. We show that the second-order conditions for a symmetric optimum take a particularly simple form, ruling out both excessive cooperative substitutability and excessive cooperative complementarity, and nest...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Bulletin of Economic Research
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0307-3378
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8586.2007.00271.x