منابع مشابه
Belief Merging versus Judgment Aggregation
The problem of aggregating pieces of propositional information coming from several agents has given rise to an intense research activity. Two distinct theories have emerged. On the one hand, belief merging has been considered in AI as an extension of belief revision. On the other hand, judgment aggregation has been developed in political philosophy and social choice theory. Judgment aggregation...
متن کاملBelief Merging and Judgment Aggregation in Fuzzy Setting
Social choice theory defines “preference aggregation” as forming collective preferences over a given set of alternatives. Likewise, “judgment aggregation” pertains to forming collective judgments on a given set of logically interrelated propositions. This paper extends beyond classical propositional logic into the realm of general multivalued logic, so that we can handle realistic collective de...
متن کاملCognitive Style and Auditor's judgment: Does Cognitive Style mitigate the Impact of recency bias on the auditors’ belief revision process?
Abstract: The purpose of the present study is two-dimensional. First, provide more evidence of the effects of information order on auditors' beliefs, and secondly, examine whether auditors vary their beliefs in different cognitive styles. These goals were achieved through the use of experienced professional auditors. To determine the effects of information sequence, Hogarth and Einhorn’s belie...
متن کاملbelief function and the transferable belief model
Beliefs are the result of uncertainty. Sometimes uncertainty is because of a random process and sometimes the result of lack of information. In the past, the only solution in situations of uncertainty has been the probability theory. But the past few decades, various theories of other variables and systems are put forward for the systems with no adequate and accurate information. One of these a...
متن کاملActing Contrary to Our Professed Beliefs or the Gulf between Occurrent Judgment and Dispositional Belief
People often sincerely assert or judge one thing (for example, that all the races are intellectually equal) while at the same time being disposed to act in a way evidently quite contrary to the espoused attitude (for example, in a way that seems to suggest an implicit assumption of the intellectual superiority of their own race). Such cases should be regarded as ‘in-between’ cases of believing,...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Psychological Review
سال: 1895
ISSN: 0033-295X
DOI: 10.1037/h0067361