Labor Insurance
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Taxation, Insurance, and Precautionary Labor
We examine optimal taxation and social insurance with adverse selection in competitive insurance markets. In the previous literature, it has been shown that, with perfect insurance markets, social insurance improves welfare since it is able to redistribute without creating distortions. This result has been taken as robust to the introduction of adverse selection as this would only provide addit...
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This paper uses an estimated structural model to argue that the option to move in and out of the parental home is an important insurance channel against labor market risk for youths who do not attend college. Using data from the NLSY97, I construct a new monthly panel of parent-youth coresidence outcomes and use it to document an empirical relationship between these movements and individual lab...
متن کاملTaxation , Insurance and Precautionary Labor DIW
We examine optimal taxation and social insurance if insurance markets are imperfect. This requires the development of a theory of labor supply under uncertainty. We show that the case for social insurance is not generally reinforced by adverse selection in insurance markets as social insurance will have welfare-decreasing e ects on the labor market. Furthermore, positive and normative implicati...
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The focus of this paper is on the implications of income uncertainty for the optimal labor supply. The meaningful distinction between Knightian uncertainty, which is often attributed to Frank Knight (1921), and risk is allowed. Agents are both uncertainty averse and risk averse. The labor-leisure and the labor-leisure-saving choices are studied under Knightian uncertainty in one-period and two-...
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If entitlement to UI bene ts must be earned with employment, generous UI is an additional bene t to an employment relationship, so it promotes job creation. If individuals are risk neutral, UI is fairly priced, and the UI system prevents moralhazard unemployed workers, the generosity of UI has no e¤ect on unemployment. As with Ricardian Equivalence, this result should be useful to pinpoint the ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Political Economy
سال: 1904
ISSN: 0022-3808,1537-534X
DOI: 10.1086/251052