Labor leverage, coordination failures, and aggregate risk

نویسندگان

چکیده

This paper studies an economy in which demand spillovers make firms’ production decisions strategic complements. Firms choose their operating leverage trading off higher fixed costs for lower variable costs. Operating governs exposures to aggregate labor productivity shock. In equilibrium, firms exhibit excessive because they do not internalize that with is more likely fall into a recession following negative Welfare losses coming from failure coordinate are amplified by suboptimal risk-taking, magnifies the impact of shocks onto output.

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Financial Economics

سال: 2021

ISSN: ['1879-2774', '0304-405X']

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2021.06.036