Leader, Follower: Strategic Investments with Asymmetric Spillovers
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Leader-follower stochastic differential game with asymmetric information and applications
This paper is concernedwith a leader–follower stochastic differential gamewith asymmetric information, where the information available to the follower is based on some sub-σ -algebra of that available to the leader. Such kind of game problem has wide applications in finance, economics and management engineering such as newsvendor problems, cooperative advertising and pricing problems. Stochasti...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2005
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.880010