Leakage-Resilient Certificate-Based Signature Resistant to Side-Channel Attacks
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Certificate-Based Encryption Resilient to Key Leakage
Certificate-based encryption (CBE) is an important class of public key encryption but the existing schemes are secure only under the premise that the decryption key (or private key) and master private key are absolutely secret. In fact, a lot of side channel attacks and cold boot attacks can leak secret information of a cryptographic system. In this case, the security of the cryptographic syste...
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A cryptographic primitive is leakage-resilient, if it remains secure even if an adversary can learn a bounded amount of arbitrary information about the computation with every invocation. As a consequence, the physical implementation of a leakage-resilient primitive is secure against every side-channel as long as the amount of information leaked per invocation is bounded. In this paper we prove ...
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By combining the extraction of side-channel information leakages with classical cryptanalysis techniques, the recently introduced Algebraic SideChannel Attacks trade a part of the data complexity in standard DPA attacks for more computations. But predicting the success rate of such attacks is made harder because of the numerous parameters that come into play when solving large algebraic systems...
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Template Attack is widely accepted to be one of the most powerful side-channel attacks, because it is usually assumed that one has a full knowledge of targeted crypto devices and thus be well capable of characterizing the side-channel leakages. However, the question of whether Template Attack is really optimal in terms of leakage exploitation rate is still unclear. In this paper, we present a n...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: IEEE Access
سال: 2019
ISSN: 2169-3536
DOI: 10.1109/access.2019.2896773