Learning and sophistication in coordination games
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Optimal Learning in Coordination Games
An Experimental Investigation of Optimal Learning in Coordination Games by Andreas Blume and Uri Gneezy This paper presents an experimental investigation of optimal learning in repeated coordination games. We find evidence for such learning when we limit both the cognitive demands on players and the information available to them. We also find that uniqueness of the optimal strategy is no guaran...
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Akira Namatame, Hiroshi Sato Dept. of Computer Science, National Defense Academy Yokosuka, 239-8686, JAPAN E-mail: { nama, hsato}@cc.nda.ac.jp Abstract An important aspect of collective intelligence is the learning strategy adapted by each agent. An interesting problem which has been widely investigated is under what circumstances will agents converge to some particular equilibrium? We consider...
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In this paper, we provide a theoretical prediction of the way in which adaptive players behave in the long run in games with strict Nash equilibria. In the model, each player picks the action which has the highest assessment, which is a weighted average of past payoffs. Each player updates his assessment of the chosen action in an adaptive manner. Almost sure convergence to a Nash equilibrium i...
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This paper reports an experiment designed to detect the influence of strategic uncertainty on behavior in order statistic coordination games, which arise when a player’s best response is an order statistic of the cohort’s action combination. Unlike previous experiments using order statistic coordination games, the new experiment holds the payoff function constant and only changes cohort size an...
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Despite the progress in multiagent reinforcement learning via formalisms based on stochastic games, these have difficulties coping with a high number of agents due to the combinatorial explosion in the number of joint actions. One possible way to reduce the complexity of the problem is to let agents form groups of limited size so that the number of the joint actions is reduced. This paper inves...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Experimental Economics
سال: 2009
ISSN: 1386-4157,1573-6938
DOI: 10.1007/s10683-009-9223-y