Learning the optimum as a Nash equilibrium
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Nominal Wage Rigidity as a Nash Equilibrium
I would like to thank the FCAR and the SSHRC for generous financial support, and André Kurmann, Louis Phaneuf, and seminar participants at the Université du Québec à Montréal for helpful discussions. The usual caveats apply. Abstract : Models of the microfoundations of nominal price rigidities show that in the absence of real rigidities, individual firms have strong incentives to adjust prices ...
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A solution concept maps strategic games into strategy predictions. Nash equilibrium is the most widely used solution concept in game theory. Three main explanations have been used to argue why players should end up playing Nash equilibrium: 1) introspective reasoning, 2) communication 3) learning. Careful study of these has shown that the case for the Nash equilibrium is not entirely unambiguou...
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We propose a new conceptual multi-agent framework which, given a game with an undesirable Nash equilibrium, will almost surely generate a new Nash equilibrium at some predetermined, more desirable pure action profile. The agent(s) targeted for reinforcement learn independently according to a standard model-free algorithm, using internally-generated states corresponding to high-level preference ...
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We examine the long-term implication of two models of learning with recency bias: recursive weights and limited memory. We show that both models generate similar beliefs and that both have a weighted universal consistency property. Using the limited-memory model we produce learning procedures that both are weighted universally consistent and converge with probability one to strict Nash equilibr...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
سال: 2000
ISSN: 0165-1889
DOI: 10.1016/s0165-1889(99)00012-3