Lending Competition, Relationship Banking, and Credit Availability for Entrepreneurs
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Credit Registries, Relationship Banking and Loan Repayment
This paper examines the impact of a public credit registry on the repayment behavior of borrowers. We implement an experimental credit market in which loan repayment is not third-party enforceable. We compare market outcome with a credit registry to that without a credit registry. This experiment is conducted for two market environments: first a market in which interactions between borrowers an...
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While competition constrains the ability of banks to extract informational rents from lending relationships, their informational monopoly also curtails competition through the threat of adverse selection. To analyze an intermediary’s optimal strategic response to these opposing effects we specify a model where the severity of asymmetric information between banks and borrowers increases with inf...
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We study the e¤ects of securitization on interbank lending competition when banks see private signals of local applicants repayment chances. If banks cannot securitize, the outcome is e¢ cient: they lend to their most creditworthy local applicants. With securitization, banks lend also to remote applicants with strong observables in order to lessen the lemons problem they face in selling their ...
متن کاملThe Importance of Being Known: Relationship Banking and Credit Limits
This paper measures the importance of bank-firm relationships in obtaining higher credit “limits.” We use data from a relatively unused section of the National Survey of Small Business Finance (NSSBF, 1993) on credit limits, credit sources, and contract terms for firms with lines of credit from multiple banks. This lets us isolate the credit limit that each bank provides the same firm, eliminat...
متن کاملMoney, credit and banking
In monetary models in which agents are subject to trading shocks there is typically an ex-post inefficiency in that some agents are holding idle balances while others are cash constrained. This inefficiency creates a role for financial intermediaries, such as banks, who accept nominal deposits and make nominal loans. We show that in general financial intermediation improves the allocation and t...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2007
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.966017