Lewis on iterated knowledge

Lewis on Knowledge Ascriptions

David Lewis’s primary contribution to the theory of knowledge is his account of knowledge ascription, which integrates an elegant version of relevant alternatives theory with a detailed version of contextualism. His account is prefigured in his discussion of accommodation in “Scorekeeping in a Language Game” (1979), and forms the central topic of his “Elusive Knowledge” (1996). I will review hi...

Lewis on Implication

On Iterated Scattered Deletion

In this note, we solve an open problem of Ito et al. 2] on iterated scattered deletion. Note: Since this note has appeared in Bull. EATCS, I have been informed that this problem has been previously solved; see Ito and Silva 1], where the authors show that there exists a regular language R such that (;) + (R) is not a CFL. I am grateful to Masami Ito for pointing me to this reference. is the set...

Lewis on Set Theory

henceforth PC) undertakes a fundamental re-examination of the relationship between merelogy, the general theory of parts, and set theory, the general theory of collections. He assumes a certain minimum background familiarity with both subjects, and limitations of space make the same assumption inevitable in the present account. Varzi (2011) is recommended as a clear, concise survey of mereology...

Lewis on Meinongian Logic

In “Truth in Fiction,” David Lewis raises four objections to a Meinongian semantics of fiction. Lewis does not deny that a Meinongian logic of fiction could be made to work, but identifies disadvantages in Meinongian semantics as a reason for recommending his own possible worlds alternative. A Meinongian semantics proposes to explain meaning without ontological prejudice. It analyzes the meanin...