Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Relational contracts, limited liability, and employment dynamics
This paper studies a relational contracting model in which the agent is protected by a limited liability constraint. The agent’s effort is his private information and affects the output stochastically. We characterize the optimal relational contract and compare the dynamics of the relationship with that under the optimal long-term contract. Under the optimal relational contract, the relationshi...
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In the classical principal-agent problem, a principal hires an agent to perform a task. The principal cares about the task’s output but has no control over it. The agent can perform the task at different effort intensities, and that choice affects the task’s output. To provide an incentive to the agent to work hard and since his effort intensity cannot be observed, the principal ties the agent’...
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We analyze a tractable class of multitask principal–agent problems, such as the one faced by a firm with a manager overseeing several projects. We allow for tasks to be complements or substitutes. We avoid the problems associated with the first-order approach by directly characterizing the shape of the agent’s indirect utility function, which exhibits a convex then concave shape in effort. We i...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Journal of Economic Theory
سال: 1983
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(83)90120-5