Liquidity runs with endogenous information acquisition
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Information Acquisition in Rumor-Based Bank Runs
We study the endogenous information acquisition and withdrawal-redeposit decisions of individual agents when a liquidity event triggers a spreading rumor and therefore exposes a bank to a run. Uncertainty about the bank’s liquidity and potential failure motivates agents who hear the rumor to acquire additional information. Although the bank run equilibrium is unique given the additional signal’...
متن کاملLiquidity and Financial Market Runs
We model a run on a financial market, in which each risk-neutral investor fears having to liquidate shares after a run, but before prices can recover back to fundamental values. To avoid having to possibly liquidate shares at the marginal post-run price—in which case the risk-averse market-making sector will already hold a lot of share inventory and thus be more reluctant to absorb additional s...
متن کاملStrategic Trading, Liquidity and Information Acquisition
We study endogenous liquidity trading in a market with long-lived asymmetric information. We distinguish between public information, tractable information that can be acquired and intractable information that cannot be acquired. Besides information asymmetry and noise, the adverse-selection spread depends on the diffusion of intractable information and on the interest rate. With endogenous liqu...
متن کاملMatching Allocation Problems with Endogenous Information Acquisition
The paper introduces the assumption of costly information acquisition to the theory of mechanism design for matching allocation problems. It is shown that the assumption of endogenous information acquisition greatly changes some of the cherished results in that theory: in particular, the first-best might not be implementable. Moreover, it might not even be possible to implement the second-best ...
متن کاملVoting with endogenous information acquisition: Experimental evidence
The Condorcet jury model with costless but informative signals about the true state of the world predicts that the efficiency of group decision-making increases unambiguously with the group size. However, if signal acquisition is made an endogenous decision, then if signals are costly, rational voters have disincentives to purchase information as the group size becomes larger. We investigate th...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Economics Letters
سال: 2008
ISSN: 0165-1765
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2007.11.010