Litigation and Selection with Correlated Two-Sided Incomplete Information
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Two-sided Matching with Incomplete Information∗
Stability in a two-sided matching model with non-transferrable utility and with incomplete information is investigated. Each agent has interdependent preferences which depend on his own type and on the possibly unknown types of agents on the other side of the market. In a one-sided incomplete information model in which workers’ types are private information, a firm joins a worker in a block to ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: American Law and Economics Review
سال: 2018
ISSN: 1465-7252,1465-7260
DOI: 10.1093/aler/ahy005