Litigation and settlement under loss aversion
نویسندگان
چکیده
Abstract In this paper, we investigate how loss aversion affects people’s behavior in private litigation. We find that a loss-averse plaintiff demands higher settlement for intermediate claims to maintain her threat proceed trial following rejection compared loss-neutral plaintiff. For larger claims, lower offer increase the probability as pains extra trial. also various policies affect litigants’ decisions. Only reduction asymmetry of information about odds uniformly leads rates.
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: European Journal of Law and Economics
سال: 2023
ISSN: ['1572-9990', '0929-1261']
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10657-023-09777-6