Litigation with Symmetric Bargaining and Two-Sided Incomplete Information

Two-sided Matching with Incomplete Information∗

Stability in a two-sided matching model with non-transferrable utility and with incomplete information is investigated. Each agent has interdependent preferences which depend on his own type and on the possibly unknown types of agents on the other side of the market. In a one-sided incomplete information model in which workers’ types are private information, a firm joins a worker in a block to ...

Convergence of a Dynamic Matching and Bargaining Market with Two-sided Incomplete Information to Perfect Competition

Consider a decentralized, dynamic market with an infinite horizon in which both buyers and sellers have private information concerning their values for the indivisible traded good. Time is discrete, each period has length δ, and each unit of time a large number of new buyers and sellers enter the market to trade. Within a period each buyer is matched with a seller and each seller is matched wit...

Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Infinite-Horizon Model with Two-Sided Uncertainty

The resolution of any bargaining conflict depends crucially on the relative urgency of the agents to reach agreement and the information each agent has about the others’ preferences. This paper explores, within the context of an infinite-horizon bargaining model with two-sided uncertainty, how timing and information affect the rational behaviour of agents when commitment is not possible. Since ...

Department of Economics Alternating-offer Bargaining with Two-sided Incomplete Information

Contract Bargaining with Symmetric Information∗

This paper reviews a recent literature that extends the Rubinstein/Stahl bargaining model to the case of contract bargaining. Theoretical issues such as the appropriate game form, existence and uniqueness of equilibria are discussed. The paper finishes with a brief overview of some applications of the framework.