Loan officers and loan ‘delinquency’ in Microfinance: A Zambian case

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ژورنال

عنوان ژورنال: Accounting Forum

سال: 2007

ISSN: 0155-9982,1467-6303

DOI: 10.1016/j.accfor.2006.11.005