منابع مشابه
NIH selects 9 faculty members for grants to boost innovative research
Feral cats in northern california have enabled researchers to unlock the biological secret behind a rare, striped cheetah found only in subSaharan africa, according to researchers at the School of medicine, the national cancer institute and Hudsonalpha institute for Biotechnology in Huntsville, alabama. the study is the first to identify a molecular basis of coat patterning in mammals. the scie...
متن کاملFunding global emergency medicine research—from seed grants to NIH support
BACKGROUND Funding for global health has grown significantly over the past two decades. Numerous funding opportunities for international development and research work exist; however, they can be difficult to navigate. The 2013 Academic Emergency Medicine consensus conference on global health and emergency care identified the need to strengthen global emergency care research funding, solidify ex...
متن کاملA Comparison of Optimal Tariffs and Welfare under No Lobbying, Domestic Lobbying, and Domestic-foreign Lobbying
Whether and what type of the lobbying-induced trade policies can improve the domestic welfare? We show that as compared to the case of no lobbying and the case of domestic lobbying, the domestic-foreign lobbying achieves the lowest tariff and may also realize the highest welfare for the domestic country. Our results suggest that the domestic-foreign lobbying may contribute to a freer trade in t...
متن کاملLobbying against Environmental Regulation vs. Lobbying for Loopholes
We analyze the determinants of environmental policy when two firms engage in two types of lobbying against a restriction on allowed pollution: General lobbying increases the total amount of allowed pollution, which is beneficial for both firms. Private lobbying increases the individual pollution standard of the lobbying firm, but has a negative or zero effect on the allowed emissions of the com...
متن کاملBribes , Lobbying , and Development
When faced with a regulatory constraint, firms can either comply, bribe the regulator to get around the rule, or lobby the government to relax it. We analyze this choice, and its consequences, in a simple dynamic model. In equilibrium, when the level of development is low, firms are more inclined to bend the rule through bribery but they tend to switch to lobbying when the level of development ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Nature
سال: 2014
ISSN: 0028-0836,1476-4687
DOI: 10.1038/515019a