Loss aversion and competition in Vickrey auctions: Money ain't no good
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چکیده
منابع مشابه
Risk aversion and loss aversion in core-selecting auctions
Core-selecting combinatorial auctions have been introduced as an alternative to the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism because VCG results in payments that are not in the core with respect to bids, leading to unfair payments, unacceptably low revenues, and unstable outcomes. This raises an auction selection problem for an auctioneer deciding whether to employ a core-selecting auction or VCG ...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Games and Economic Behavior
سال: 2019
ISSN: 0899-8256
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.02.014