Lost in transmission: Testimonial justification and practical reason

Knowledge, Justification, and Reason-Based Belief

Is knowledge definable as justified true belief (“JTB”)? We argue that one can legitimately answer positively or negatively, depending on how the notion of justification is understood. To facilitate our argument, we introduce a simple propositional logic of reason-based belief. We show that this logic is sufficiently flexible to accommodate various useful features, including quantification over...

A Defense of Reductionism about Testimonial Justification of Beliefs

This paper defends reductionism about testimonial justification of beliefs against two influential arguments. One is the empirical argument to the effect that the reductionist justification of our trust in testimony is either circular since it relies on testimonial evidence or else there is scarce evidence in support of our trust in testimony. The other is the transcendental argument to the eff...

Lost in transmission…?

“There Must Be a Reason”: Osama, Saddam, and Inferred Justification

One of the most curious aspects of the 2004 presidential election was the strength and resilience of the belief among many Americans that Saddam Hussein was linked to the terrorist attacks of September 11. Scholars have suggested that this belief was the result of a campaign of false information and innuendo from the Bush administration. We call this the information environment explanation. Usi...

Two Dualisms of Practical Reason

Dualism is one way to put the traditional dualism of practical reason, i.e., that practical reason can never declare that there is greater overall reason to conform to moral, or prudential, requirements in a case of conflict between our own self-interest and our obligations to others.1 In this paper, I distinguish two methods by which one might accept Dualism. First, I discuss a substantive dua...