Macro-Prudential Financial Regulation: Panacea or Placebo?
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Central Bank Independence and Macro- prudential Regulation
We consider the optimality of various institutional arrangements for agencies that conduct macro-prudential regulation and monetary policy. When a central bank is in charge of price and financial stability, a new time inconsistency problem may arise. Ex-ante, the central bank chooses the socially optimal level of inflation. Ex-post, however, the central bank chooses inflation above the social o...
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ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: Amsterdam Law Forum
سال: 2009
ISSN: 1876-8156
DOI: 10.37974/alf.70