Majoritarian Bargaining over Budgetary Divisions and Policy
نویسندگان
چکیده
منابع مشابه
On Majoritarian Bargaining with Incomplete Information
December 2008 [Abstract] This paper studies a finite horizon version of Baron and Ferejohn’s (1989) majoritarian bargaining with incomplete information. Our devised model essentially blends Spence’s signaling and the coalition formation of majoritarian bargaining. The main findings include: (i) oversized coalitions may arise in equilibrium and allowing for delay can be optimal for a proposer; (...
متن کاملSubgame Perfect Equilibria in Majoritarian Bargaining
We study three-person bargaining games with discounting, where an alternative is accepted if it is approved by a majority of players. We characterize the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs and show that for any proposal in the space of possible agreements there exists a discount factor such that given the proposal is made and accepted by one of the players in period zero. Also we constr...
متن کاملPlea Bargaining with Budgetary Constraints and Deterrence
In this paper, I construct a simple model that illustrates conditions under which increased criminal sanctions can lead to increased levels of crime. This finding is derived from the interaction of binding budgetary constraints and plea bargaining, given that the costs of trial are assumed to be increasing in the size of sanction. In an environment with these institutional features, maximal san...
متن کاملBudgetary Policy and Unemployment Dynamics in an Olg Model with Collective Bargaining*
We consider a dynamic general equilibrium model with capital accumulation and collective wage bargaining and investigate how unemployment responds to structural shocks under two stylised budgetary policies. Under balanced budgets, tax adjustments lead to higher unemployment on impact but enable a quick recovery of employment. By contrast, unbalanced budgets mitigate unemployment effects on impa...
متن کاملOn The Centrality of Policy Outcomes in Dynamic Majoritarian Bargaining Games
We analyze an inÞnitely repeated divide-the-dollar bargaining game with an endogenous reversion point. In each session a new dollar is divided among three legislators according to the proposal of a randomly recognized member if a majority prefer so or according to previous periods allocation otherwise. We characterize a Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium of this game and study the resultant e...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
ژورنال
عنوان ژورنال: SSRN Electronic Journal
سال: 2020
ISSN: 1556-5068
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.3672273