Making a case for introspection

Making a case for introspection

Defending first-person introspective access to own mental states, we argue against Carruthers’ claim of mindreading being prior to meta-cognition and for a fundamental difference between how we understand our own and others’ mental states. We conclude that a model based on one mechanism but involving two different kinds of access for self and other is sufficient and more consistent with the

Case-Based Introspection

To effectively reason about one’s own knowledge, goals, and reasoning requires an ability to explicitly introspect. A computational model of introspection is a second-order theory that contains a formal language for representing first-order processes and that processes instances of this representation. The reasoning algorithm used to perform such processing is similar to the algorithm used to r...

Making a Case for More Case Reports

Making a Case for BPC

In 2005, the US National Academies—the National Academy of Science, the National Academy of Engineering, the Institute of Medi cine, and the National Research Council—issued a report called Rising Above the Gathering Storm: Ener gizing and Employing America for a Brighter Economic Future.1 Reporting at the request of a bipartisan group in Congress, a 20-member panel of advisers to the nation on...

Introspection.

Two main questions about introspection are addressed: whether it exists, and whether it is a reliable source of self-knowledge. Most philosophers have assumed that the answers to both questions are positive, whereas an increasing number of cognitive scientists take the view that introspection is either nonexistent (with self-attributions of mental states being made on the same sort of interpret...