Managerial ability, compensation incentives, and corporate performance

Corporate Payout Policy and Managerial Stock Incentives*

We examine how corporate payout policy is affected by managerial stock incentives using data on more than 1100 nonfinancial firms during 1993-97. We find that management share ownership encourages higher payouts by firms with potentially the greatest agency problems—those with low market-to-book ratios and low management stock ownership. We also find that management stock options change the com...

Corporate Restructuring, Downsizing and Managerial Compensation

There is common consensus that managerial compensation is strongly tied to rm size and much less so to nancial performance. One suspects that observed restructuring and downsizing in corporations in recent years may have an eeect on these results. Based on multi-task theoretical considerations, our evidence for German industrial rms shows that pay for rm size elasticities decrease only for larg...

“ Essays on Corporate Governance , Managerial Incentives , and Crowdfunding ”

Ronghuo Zheng ([email protected]) “Essays on Corporate Governance, Managerial Incentives, and

Corporate Criminal Law and Organization Incentives: A Managerial Perspective∗

Corporate criminal liability puts a serious challenge to the economic theory of enforcement. Are corporate crimes different from other crimes? Are these crimes best deterred by punishing individuals, punishing corporations, or both? What is optimal structure of sanctions? Should corporate liability be criminal or civil? This paper has two major contributions to the literature. First, it provide...

Appendix for “ Managerial risk - taking incentives and corporate pension policy ”